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Price Discrimination and Bargaining:  
Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices†
By Matthew Grennan*
Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price 
discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical 
predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-
supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze 
bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. 
While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different 
buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., 
mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find 
that: (i ) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening 
competition; and (ii ) results depend ultimately on a previously 
unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)
In business-to-business markets, prices are often negotiated. This can result in 
different buyers paying substantially different prices for the same product from the 
same supplier. Whenever some buyers are able to “get a better deal” than others in 
this way, policymakers, potential middlemen, and other buyers naturally wonder 
if interventions that move toward more uniform prices might make buyers  better 
off. This paper estimates the welfare effects of different hospitals paying differ-
ent prices—and several interventions that would make prices more uniform—in 
the market for coronary stents, a “blockbuster” medical device on which hospitals 
spend over $5 billion each year.
The price of medical technologies, such as coronary stents, is often cited as a 
driver of the increasing costs of healthcare (Keehan et al. 2011). Many of the inter-
ventions intended to lower these costs impose restrictions that would make prices 
more uniform, but the actual effects of these interventions on prices and welfare are 
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not well understood. For example, hospital mergers make prices more uniform by 
creating a single buyer from several. Though a common justification for hospital 
mergers is to lower input costs, evidence that they do so has been mixed (Dranove 
and Lindrooth 2003). Group purchasing organizations (GPO)—where a group of 
buyers delegate purchasing authority to a third party—also make prices more uni-
form, and they permeate much of hospital purchasing. The actual value provided by 
GPOs is a constant topic of debate, however, especially in the market for coronary 
stents and other “physician preference items” (Burns and Lee 2008). The recent 
healthcare reform efforts in the United States have brought calls for greater market 
transparency, with many anticipating that such reform would lead to more uniform 
prices across hospitals, but mixed predictions as to who might benefit (Kyle and 
Ridley 2007). The lack of consensus regarding the impact of these interventions on 
the cost of critical healthcare inputs is driven in part by the fact that economic theory 
alone offers ambiguous predictions, and necessary data are difficult to procure.
This paper uses new panel data on the prices and quantities transferred between 
hospitals and coronary stent manufacturers to estimate a structural model of supply 
and demand that incorporates bargaining over prices. I then use the estimated model 
to compare welfare outcomes under the current pricing regime (where different hos-
pitals pay different prices for the same stent) and counterfactual regimes with trans-
parency, group purchasing, and mergers. I find that: (i) in this market, more uniform 
pricing actually works against hospitals through a competition softening effect; and 
(ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect. Whether 
a given intervention will raise or lower stent prices hinges on the details of how it 
unlocks these two forces.
The way in which a change to more uniform pricing affects competition relates 
directly to the theory of price discrimination with oligopoly.1 If hospitals are more 
vertically differentiated from one another in their preferences for stents (what the 
literature would call best-response symmetry among manufacturers), then competi-
tion will tend to intensify with more uniform prices (Holmes 1989). If hospitals are 
instead more horizontally differentiated (best-response asymmetry), then competi-
tion will tend to soften with more uniform pricing, as manufacturers price to their 
captive markets (Corts 1998). Thus, understanding if different prices are good or 
bad for hospitals requires knowing first the extent to which variation in price is due 
to variation in demand, and then whether this demand variation is vertical or hori-
zontal. A complete analysis requires going further and accounting for the fact that 
prices are not “set” by suppliers as they are in the price discrimination literature—
stent prices are negotiated.
When buyers and suppliers negotiate prices, supplier costs, buyer willingness-
to-pay, and competition determine only a range of potential prices (versus a single 
price) for each buyer and supplier.2 The final price will depend on what I refer 
to as each firm’s bargaining ability—the ability to reach a more favorable point 
within that range. Heterogeneity in bargaining abilities turns out to be important in 
1 Stole (2007) and Armstrong (2006) offer excellent reviews of this large literature.
2 The simplest example is bilateral monopoly, where the buyer won’t pay a price above its willingness-to-pay, 
and the seller won’t sell for a price less than its cost. With a competing supplier, the buyer has an outside option 
that lowers the top of this range, but as long as the competing product is not a perfect substitute, there will still be a 
range of prices at which the buyer and supplier could trade.
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 explaining the variation in prices for the same stent sold to different hospitals—as 
one hospital purchasing manager put it, “There is a lot of wiggle room [in prices].”3 
Further, this importance of variation in bargaining ability means that a complete 
understanding of any market intervention will require understanding how it affects 
bargaining abilities, in addition to competition. The theoretical model in this paper 
illustrates precisely how bargaining adds a new dimension to debates on price dis-
crimination and uniform pricing and how this bargaining effect interacts with the 
previously established competitive effect.
Despite the ambiguity of the predictions from theoretical work on price discrim-
ination and bargaining, the empirical literatures in these areas are still relatively 
small. This is largely because empirical studies of business-to-business markets 
(where both often occur) have been limited by the difficulty of accessing data on 
transfers between buyers and suppliers. Of the recent empirical studies involving 
price discrimination (Duggan and Scott Morton 2006; Hastings 2008; Villas-Boas 
2009), bargaining (Dranove, Satterthwaite, and Sfekas 2008; Dafny 2010; Ho 2009; 
Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012), and vertical contracting relationships more gener-
ally (Ho, Ho, and Mortimer 2012), only Hastings (2008) and Dafny (2010) have had 
access to data on the actual buyer-supplier transfers. Hastings (2008) looks at the 
effects of price discrimination versus uniform pricing between gasoline stations and 
wholesalers, but does not consider bargaining. Dafny (2010) is interested in diag-
nosing the presence of market power among providers of employee health insur-
ance, but not analyzing bargaining or price discrimination per se. This paper builds 
on previous empirical and theoretical research by quantifying several mechanisms 
previously illustrated in theory and demonstrating new interactions between price 
discrimination and bargaining in a context where both are important.
Central to this study is an unusually detailed panel dataset, providing the quanti-
ties purchased and prices paid for all coronary stents sold to 96 US hospitals from 
January 2004 through June 2007, at the stent-hospital-month level. The stent market 
is a business-to-business market in which hospitals generate revenue by implanting 
stents during angioplasty procedures, and the stent is a necessary input that the hos-
pital must purchase from a device manufacturer. Contracts are negotiated, stipulat-
ing the price at which the hospital can purchase a given stent over a specified period 
of time, and different hospitals negotiate different prices for the same stent. This 
price variation has significant implications for profits. Moving from the twenty-fifth 
to seventy-fifth percentile in price would result in a change of about $300,000 annu-
ally (about 4 nurses’ salaries) at the average-sized hospital. Section I of the paper 
provides more details regarding the industry and data.
Even with these detailed data, several important variables—cost, willingness-
to-pay, and bargaining ability—are unobserved. Further, separating the impact of 
demand and competition on the range of potential prices from the impact of bar-
gaining abilities within that range requires an explicit model of how competition 
and bargaining determine prices. In Sections II and III, I address these challenges 
with a structural empirical approach, similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), 
but using a pricing model that generalizes the standard Bertrand-Nash price-setting 
3 C. Zander, personal communication, September, 2008.
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model to allow for bargaining over prices. The model has two parts: (i) a model 
of doctor demand for coronary stents uses the price and quantity data to estimate 
demand for each stent; and (ii) a model of how prices emerge from competition and 
bargaining uses the demand estimates and the price and quantity data to estimate 
costs and relative bargaining abilities.
On the demand side, a random coefficients discrete choice model incorporates 
heterogeneity in preferences for stents across hospitals, physicians, and patients. 
The fact that prices are fixed in long-term contracts provides two new sources of 
identification: First, doctor preferences evolve over time while prices remain fixed; 
so when prices are renegotiated, the movement is along the demand curve. Second, 
bargaining ability provides a new supply shifter. The resulting willingness-to-pay 
estimates closely match external data on procedure profits, and estimates of sub-
stitution patterns agree with anecdotal evidence that doctors are slightly price-sen-
sitive, are brand-loyal, and can differ widely in their preferences over the different 
stents available on the market.
Given the demand estimates, I estimate cost and bargaining ability parameters 
using a pricing model in which each stent manufacturer and hospital engage in 
bilateral Nash bargaining, and these bilateral outcomes form a Nash equilibrium 
with each other. This model relates to the theoretical literature on bargaining with 
externalities (Horn and Wolinsky 1988), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) use a 
close variant in an empirical setting. I solve the model for the equilibrium pricing 
equation, which is useful in two ways: First, it clarifies how this bargaining model 
is a generalization of the standard Bertrand-Nash differentiated products pricing 
model, providing a tight link to theoretical work on price discrimination. Second, it 
shows that price is equal to cost plus a margin that depends on bargaining abilities, 
elasticities, and the marginal contribution of each product relative to its competitors, 
making it clear how covariation in price and demand can identify bargaining ability 
parameters separately from costs. The estimates show that allowing for heteroge-
neity in bargaining abilities in addition to heterogeneity in demand is critical for 
explaining the price variation observed in the data.4
The heterogeneity across hospitals in demand and bargaining abilities also play 
quantitatively important roles in the counterfactual changes due to transparency, 
group purchasing, and mergers considered in Section IV. Because different hospitals 
have doctors with different brand loyalties (variation in hospital demand is more 
horizontal than vertical), a change to more uniform pricing will soften competition 
as suppliers price to extract surplus from their captive hospitals. As a result, any 
intervention that intends to lower prices through making them more uniform must 
be accompanied by an increase in hospital bargaining ability. I estimate that this 
required increase can be rather large. In a GPO made of all hospitals in the sample, 
the bargaining ability of the GPO would have to be above the seventieth percentile 
of the individual hospital bargaining abilities.
Section IVB extends the analysis to 100 merger simulations in order to inform the 
conditions under which multi-hospital systems might be able to decrease stent prices. 
This also generates a deeper understanding of the competitive and  bargaining effects 
4 A companion paper, Grennan (2012), uses the panel structure of the data and hospital characteristics to further 
explore the sources of these bargaining abilities.
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because the randomly selected hospitals for each merger have varying amounts of 
symmetry in their preferences. I develop a measure of the extent of (a)symmetry and 
quantify its relation to merger outcomes. For simulations with postmerger bargain-
ing abilities equal to the mean of the merging hospitals, a one standard deviation 
increase in symmetry leads to a 1.3 percent increase in hospital surplus. The inter-
action of this effect with the bargaining effect is also quantitatively significant: the 
importance of symmetry more than doubles when the postmerger bargaining ability 
is changed to the maximum of the merging hospitals.
While this paper focuses on the market for coronary stents, price variation across 
different buyers for the same product—and proposals to restrict it—occur in a vari-
ety of markets. Many aspects of the approach used here are flexible enough to be 
applied to other settings. The credibility of any structural study, however, depends on 
capturing important industry-specific details, which are the topic of the next section.
I. Coronary Stents: Industry Description and Data
The coronary stent industry is not only an example of a business-to-business mar-
ket, it is also interesting and important in and of itself. The coronary stent is a medi-
cal device used in angioplasty, an important treatment for blockages in the arteries 
surrounding the heart (a condition known as coronary artery disease). These block-
ages can cause pain, loss of mobility, and eventually heart attack, making coronary 
artery disease the leading cause of death in the United States.5 Angioplasty is a 
minimally invasive technique in which the doctor threads a balloon-tipped cath-
eter from an access point (usually the femoral artery near the groin) to the heart. 
Using imaging devices, the doctor positions the balloon tip across the blockage, and 
expands the balloon, compressing the blockage to the artery walls. A stent is a small 
metal tube that is then placed via catheter where the blockage was cleared and left 
in the body as structural support for the damaged artery wall. Though angioplasty is 
attractive due to its minimally invasive nature, traditional stainless steel “bare-metal 
stents” (BMS) have the drawback that scar tissue growth around this foreign body 
can lead to significant renarrowing of the artery in about 33 percent of cases. “Drug-
eluting stents” (DES) attempt to remedy this problem by coating the stent with a 
drug that discourages scar tissue growth, and they have been successful in reducing 
the incidence of renarrowing to near 9 percent.6
A. The “Economics” of the Stent Market
With the introduction of DES, stents became the first medical device to reach 
revenue levels similar to those of a “blockbuster” drug. The three million stents 
implanted worldwide each year generate annual revenues of more than $5 billion 
to stent manufacturers and $30 billion to hospitals and doctors for the stenting 
procedures.
5 US Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Heart Lung and Blood 
Institute Diseases and Conditions Index. www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Cad/CAD_WhatIs.html (June 2008).
6 Robert J. Applegate, “Drug-Eluting Stents: The Final Answer to Restenosis?” Wake Forest University Medical 
Center, http://www1.wfubmc.edu/articles/CME+Drug-eluting+Stents (September 15, 2008).
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Hospitals and doctors generate revenue from each angioplasty procedure, usually 
via reimbursement from a patient’s insurer. The reimbursement rates are negoti-
ated by the hospital with each insurer (usually taking Medicare rates, which are not 
negotiated, as a starting point), so they vary across hospitals and across insurers for 
each hospital. The average Medicare reimbursement rates for a basic stenting proce-
dure are $812 for the doctor, regardless of the type of stent used; and for hospitals, 
$10,422 for a BMS and $11,814 for a DES.7 Reimbursements do not depend on the 
manufacturer of the stent.
Out of this revenue comes the hospital’s costs, including the cost of any stents 
used. Thus, the hospitals keep in profit any price savings they can achieve on the cost 
of stents. While in many markets there might be some interaction between the costs 
negotiated with suppliers and the revenues negotiated from buyers, that is not the 
case here. For Medicare patients, the reimbursement levels are fixed; and the reim-
bursements from private insurers are generally negotiated as a markup on Medicare 
rates across all procedures performed at the hospital. Thus, reimbursement levels at 
each hospital are fixed with respect to the cost of stents.
B. Data Overview 
The dataset used in this paper is from Millennium Research Group’s Marketrack 
survey of catheter labs, the source that major device manufacturers subscribe to 
for detailed market research. The goal of the survey is to provide an accurate pic-
ture of market shares and prices by US region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West).8 
The US market is dominated by four large multinational firms: the Abbott Vascular 
(formerly Guidant) division of Abbott Laboratories, Boston Scientific, Johnson and 
Johnson’s Cordis division, and Medtronic, which together make up over 99 percent 
of US coronary stent sales.9 These manufacturers offered a total of nine BMS and 
two DES during the sample period.
The key variables in the data are the price paid and quantity used for each stent 
in each hospital in each month. In addition, the hospitals report monthly totals for 
different procedures performed, such as diagnostic angiographies, and prices and 
quantities for other products used in the catheter lab, such as balloon catheters and 
guiding catheters. After removing hospitals with incomplete reporting (usually fail-
ure to report price data—see online Appendix A for details), the dataset I use for 
analysis is an unbalanced panel of 10,098 stent-hospital-month observations at 96 
US hospitals over 42 months from January 2004 through June 2007.10
7 By “basic” I mean single-vessel operations with no “modifiers” for difficulty of the procedure, location of the 
hospital, etc. These numbers represent the lower bound in revenue for these procedures (Medicare upper bounds are 
roughly 1.5 times these payments, and private insurers generally reimburse at even higher levels). Numbers from 
Federal Register, Volume 68, No. 216, November 7, 2003; and Federal Register, Volume 68, Number 148, August 
1, 2003.
8 See www.mrg.net for more details on the survey.
9 iData Research, Inc. “US Markets for Interventional Cardiology” (2006).
10 According to the American College of Cardiology, this sample represents less than five percent of all cardiac 
catheterization labs in the United States. The sample, however, is focused on larger labs, and so represents approxi-
mately 15 percent of all stenting procedures. Because the dataset used in this paper is sold as market research to 
the device manufacturers, hospitals are anonymous, which, unfortunately, prevents linking this dataset with other 
data sources on the hospitals. Of the hospitals in the sample, 31 percent are teaching hospitals and 63 percent are 
public institutions.
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Figure 1 shows aggregate trends in quantities and prices over the sample period. 
In March 2004, a second DES entered the market, resulting in decreased prices and 
increased usage of DES. In 2006, a study questioned the safety of DES, resulting in 
less DES usage and less stenting overall. In the years following June 2007, this trend 
reversed slightly, as it became clearer that DES were not as dangerous as the study 
suggested.11 For the purposes of this paper, this “DES scare” helps to identify the 
substitution patterns between DES and BMS.
C. Cross-Sectional Variation
Table 1 provides price summary statistics, documenting the variation in prices 
across hospitals. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation over mean), a com-
mon measure of price dispersion, has a mean of 0.13 in the sample. For example, 
one of the best-selling stents, DES1, has a mean price of $2,508 with a standard 
deviation of $317.
11 For an overview of the DES scare and its aftermath, see “Embers still smoldering from the 2006 ESC fire-
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Figure 1. Aggregate Trends in the Market over the Sample Period
Notes: The quantity graph shows the total number of stents implanted, also broken down into DES and BMS. The 
price graph shows median prices (and first and third quartiles) of BMS and DES.
Table 1—Price Variation across Hospitals
Stent Mean ($) SD ($) SD/Mean Min ($) Max ($) N
BMS4 1,006 175 0.17 775 1,500 25
BMS5 926 191 0.21 700 1,600 23
BMS6 952 156 0.16 775 1,475 26
BMS7 1,035 174 0.17 775 1,600 39
BMS8 1,063 338 0.32 800 1,950 11
BMS9 1,088 224 0.21 800 1,800 47
DES1 2,508 317 0.13 2,100 3,280 54
DES2 2,530 206 0.08 2,150 3,195 54
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the distribution of price ($US) across hospitals for each stent. The 
sample is restricted to September 2005 (middle of the sample in time) to isolate cross-sectional variation. There are 
N = 54 hospitals sampled, and BMS1–3 have exited the market.
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These per-unit price differences translate into significant dollar amounts. A $317 
change in price results in a difference in cost of over $300,000 per year in the 
mean-volume hospital, or nearly $1 billion per year across the three million stents 
implanted worldwide. This is about 20 percent of the annual revenue of the global 
stent market.
There are many potential explanations for this price variation across hospitals. 
Revenue for stenting procedures varies across hospitals. The relative strength of 
the interventional cardiologists versus substitute treatments and the distribution of 
patient types will vary across hospitals as well. Also, stents are differentiated prod-
ucts, and doctors vary in their preferences over which stent is best to treat a given 
patient. These variations induce different competitive environments in different hos-
pitals. The variation in the market shares of each stent, the number of diagnostic 
procedures per hospital, and the frequency with which diagnostic procedures lead 
to stenting, displayed in Table 2 and Figure 2, all provide a sense of this demand 
heterogeneity.
Prices are usually negotiated directly between each manufacturer and each hospital, 
and these negotiations are another potential source of the observed price variation. The 
typical contract is linear, specifying a price per unit for a given stent over the contract 
period, often one year.12 Who is involved in the negotiation and the incentives they 
face differ across hospitals and manufacturers, and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this could also be an important source of variation in the final price.
How much these forces influence price variation, and how they affect welfare 
with a change to uniform pricing, is ultimately an empirical question. Estimating 
the unobserved variables and disentangling their effects is the purpose of the model 
laid out in Section II.
12 Some contracts could have discrete nonlinearities, offering a lower price if the hospital uses that stent almost 
exclusively, say 80 percent of the time. While I do not observe the actual contracts, online Appendix A shows that 
there is little, if any, evidence in the data for exclusivity playing a role in the observed price variation. My demand 
identification approach allows for this possibility, however.
Table 2—Market Share Variation across Hospitals
Stent Mean (%) SD (%) SD/Mean Min (%) Max (%) N
BMS4 5 3 0.7 1 14 25
BMS5 3 2 0.6 1  7 23
BMS6 6 6 1.0 1 25 26
BMS7 4 5 1.1 1 25 39
BMS8 4 4 1.1 1 14 11
BMS9 8 8 1.0 1 32 47
DES1 43 30 0.7 1 88 54
DES2 41 30 0.7 2 93 54
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the distribution of market share (percent of all stents used) across 
hospitals. (Average shares do not add up to 100 percent because not all stents are used by all hospitals, as docu-
mented in the last column of the table.) The table is restricted to September 2005 (middle of the sample in time) to 
isolate cross-sectional variation. There are N = 54 hospitals sampled in this month, and BMS1–3 have exited the 
market.
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D. Variation over Time
While this paper is primarily concerned with understanding the cross-sectional 
variation in the data, the identification strategy will rely on variation in prices and 
market shares over time for each stent-hospital combination. Table 3 summarizes 
this variation in the data. Prices change, on average, every five months, and while 
prices decrease slightly over time on average, there is a great deal of variation in both 
the direction and size of price movements. For market shares, the average change is 
zero, but again there is a great deal of variation around the average.
II. Modeling Supply and Demand for Coronary Stents
This section uses institutional details and economic theory to construct and 
estimate a structural model that will distinguish among and quantify the various 
determinants of price variation across hospitals (demand, costs, competition, and 
bargaining abilities). The estimated model is then used in Section IV to provide 












Panel A. Diagnostic angiographies Panel B. Percent resulting in stenting
Mean SD Min Median Max N
Diagnostic angiographies (procedures/hospital-month) 283 185 58 232 934 96
Percent of diagnostic angiographies resulting in stenting  28   9  5  26  52 96
Figure 2. Distribution of Procedure Volumes across Hospitals
Notes: All patients must have a diagnostic procedure to locate any blockages and detect their severity. The graph 
on the left shows the distribution of the average number of these procedures each hospital performs per month. The 
graph on the right shows the distribution of the average percentage of these procedures that result in a stenting inter-
vention. The table below contains summary statistics for the two distributions.
Table 3—Price and Market Share Variation over Time
Mean SD Min Max N
Change in price, $ −30 214 −1,300 1,150 2,042
Change in share, percent 0 10 −77 73 10,098
Absolute change in price, $ 146 159 1 1,300 2,042
Absolute change in share, percent 5.9 8.1 0 77 10,098
Notes: Summary statistics of changes over time for a given stent-hospital combination. Prices are conditional on a 
price change occurring. Market share is percentage of stents used.
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 estimates of the welfare impact of policy changes that would limit the ability of 
device manufacturers to price discriminate.
The model predicts the quantities of each stent used by each hospital and the 
prices negotiated for each stent by each manufacturer-hospital pair in terms of a 
set of structural parameters that allow for heterogeneity across doctors/patients, 
 hospitals, and time. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and related lit-
erature, a generalized method of moments algorithm estimates these supply and 
demand parameters by matching the quantities and prices predicted by the model to 
the quantities and prices observed in the data. The main innovations in the estimation 
are: (i) that negotiated contracts introduce new sources of identification for demand; 
and (ii) the demonstration of how the assumption of price-taking buyers can be 
relaxed while still identifying cost and bargaining ability parameters separately.
The agents in the model are the device manufacturers who supply the products, 
the doctors/patients whose decisions determine demand for those products, and the 
hospitals that negotiate prices with manufacturers. The model is a two-stage game 
with no information asymmetries:
Stage 1: Pricing. Device manufacturers and hospitals contract on prices, taking 
expected future quantities into account.
Stage 2: Demand. Given prices and choice sets, doctors decide on stent purchases 
as patients arrive at the hospital.
Because the first-stage pricing equilibrium depends on expected demand, the dis-
cussion starts from the second stage and works backward.
A. A Model of Demand for Coronary Stents
I model demand using a discrete choice random utility model of how doctors 
choose which stent to use for each patient. This approach has the benefit of intui-
tively matching the doctors’ decision process, and it accommodates the fact that the 
choice sets of available stents vary across hospitals and over time. It also allows for 
very flexibly shaped demand curves and the direct computation of consumer surplus 
measures (Nevo 2000), both of which are critical in this analysis.
A “market” is a particular hospital, h, in a particular month, t. The hospital has 
contracted with a set of stent manufacturers for the set of stent models j ∈   ht . Over 
the course of a month, patients i = 1, … ,  Q ht arrive at the hospital to undergo a diag-
nostic procedure. The arrival of patients is considered exogenous to stent  pricing, 
and thus hospitals are monopsonists of their own flow of potential stenting patients.13 
The doctor chooses a treatment for each patient to maximize the following indirect 
utility function:
(1)  max 
j∈  ht 
 
 
  u ijht =  δ jht +  ε ijht ,
13 This is consistent with the findings of Dafny (2005), which finds little evidence that hospitals compete at the 
diagnosis level; it finds, rather, that they instead compete in overall hospital quality.
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where  δ jht is the mean quality of product j across all patient/doctor combinations (in 
hospital h and month t ), and  ε ijht is a stochastic quality component with distribution 
f ht (ε), representing characteristics of the specific patient/doctor combination i that 
make the patient an especially good candidate for a specific stent. In the spirit of 
Blomqvist (1991), this utility function can be thought of as a reduced form for how 
a doctor incorporates his own preferences, patient welfare, and hospital profitability 
into the treatment decision.
The set   ht also includes a choice j = 0 for a treatment other than stenting, and I 
normalize  δ 0ht = 0 so that the utility for each stent is the utility relative to the next 
best nonstent treatment. The most common alternative treatment would be no direct 
intervention (and typically a suggested diet and exercise regimen). The next most 
common would be coronary artery bypass graft surgery.14
The mean utility of product j in hospital h in month t is given by
(2)  δ jht =  θ jh −  θ p p jht +  X jt  θ x +  ξ jht ,
where  θ jh is the mean utility of product j in hospital h over the sample period;  θ p is 
the marginal disutility of price  p jht (in utils per dollar);  X jt is a matrix of month-DES 
interaction dummy variables starting in January 2006 to account for the scare over 
DES safety during this time; and  ξ jht are unobservable time fluctuations in hospital 
preferences for each stent model.15
Including the  θ jh fixed effects is important, as doing so controls for persistent 
unobserved heterogeneity at the product-hospital level (and thus also at the product 
level and hospital level). This heterogeneity across hospitals comes from different 
average preferences of doctors due to different opinions regarding the clinical data 
for each product, different mixes of patients, and different reimbursement levels for 
stenting procedures.
Because  ξ jht is an average across different doctors with different preferences and 
different patients with different characteristics, however, monthly variation occurs 
when the sample of patients varies, when the month’s patients are allocated differ-
ently among the hospital’s doctors, or when an individual doctor receives informa-
tion that changes her preferences. Attrition and recruitment of new doctors over time 
could also lead to changes in these unobserved preferences at the hospital level. 
To capture this, I model  ξ jht as evolving according to a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process:
(3)  ξ jht = ρ  ξ jht−1 +  ˜ ξ jht ,
where  ˜ ξ jht is the innovation in hospital preferences for product j at time t, and ρ mea-
sures the persistence (of the variation around the mean  θ jh ) over time.16
14 According to the Dartmouth Health Atlas, angioplasty procedures outnumbered bypass by approximately 
3 to 1 in the United States in 2007, suggesting approximately 90 percent of the outside option is no intervention.
15 Online Appendix C offers several robustness checks on this specification on subsamples of the data, with 
month dummy variables (excluded from the main specification due to evidence of attenuation bias), and with dif-
ferent distributional and evolution assumptions on the unobservables.
16 Note that any drift component of this process is subsumed into  θ jh . There are well-known challenges in models 
where dynamic processes are combined with fixed effects (for an overview, see Blundell and Bond 2000). The long 
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Not all doctor/patient combinations at a given hospital in a given month are the 
same, and the model captures these differences in the doctor/patient-specific unob-
servable term,  ε ijht . The distribution  f ht (ε) is an important component of the demand 
estimation because it directly affects the extent to which different products are sub-
stitutes for one another. I model  f ht (ε) as a mixture of nested logit models:
(4)  ε ijht =  ϵ ijht stent + (1 −  σ stent )  ϵ ijht des + (1 −  σ stent )(1 −  σ des ) ϵ ijht +  λ ijht ,
where the three ϵ terms are the random coefficients representation for a two-level 
“nested logit” model (as derived in Cardell 1997), and λ represents the mixing 
distribution;  ϵ ijht stent is a random component common to all stents, modeling the fact 
that patients vary in how badly they need a stent versus an alternative treatment—
as  σ stent ∈ [0, 1] approaches 1, there is less substitution between stents and alterna-
tives;  ϵ ijht des is a  random component common to all DES, modeling the fact that some 
patients will be especially suited for a DES or BMS—as  σ des ∈ [0, 1] approaches 
1, there is less substitution between DES and BMS;  ϵ ijht and  λ ijht are random com-
ponents specific to stent j, modeling the fact that some doctors may have very 
strong preferences for a particular stent for a particular patient;  ϵ ijht is the standard 
“logit” error term (extreme value type I normalized with mean zero and scale 1). 
The random mean shifter,  λ ijht , takes the value  λ des or  λ bms with probability  ϕ jht and 
zero otherwise. This allows the distribution of doctor/patient tastes for each stent 
to be bimodal, capturing the fact that a doctor may have a strong preference for a 
particular stent (Hastings 2008 and many papers in the marketing literature use a 
similar setup to characterize “brand loyalty”). Allowing for this possibility is criti-
cal because a bimodal distribution allows for a demand curve with multiple groups 
of consumers, each with similar willingness-to-pay, whereas a unimodal distribu-
tion does not; and these two situations have very different implications for pricing.
Market Shares and Demand Estimation.—Given this demand structure, define 
the set of patients for whom a doctor chooses product j (in hospital-month ht) as 
 jht := {i |  j = arg ma x k∈  ht   u ikht }. Then expected market shares for each stent are 
given by the choice probability for each stent in each market:
(5)  s jht = Pr [ j =  arg max k∈  ht   u ikht ] =  ∫  A jht  
 
   f ht (ε) dε.
I estimate demand for coronary stents by matching the observed market share 
data to the expected market shares predicted by the demand model, and using the 
contraction mapping from Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to invert this sys-
tem of equations to obtain an equation that is linear in the parameters, data, and 
unobservable,  ξ jht . The econometric unobservable is then isolated by taking pseudo-
differences (i.e.,  ˜ x :=  x t − ρ  x t−1 ), yielding
panel (42 months) in this dataset allows for estimation of the standard “within” estimator without the incidental 
parameters problem faced in small T panels.
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(6)  ˜ ξ jht =  ˜ δ j ( s ht ; σ, λ, ϕ) −  θ jh (1 − ρ) +  θ p ˜ p jht −  ˜ X jt  θ x ,
which can then be interacted with a set of instrumental variables  Z d satisfying 
E[ ˜ ξ  |  Z d ] = 0 to estimate the demand parameters.
Demand Identification with Negotiated Prices.—The economics of negoti-
ated prices in long-term contracts introduce two new sources of identification for 
demand: (i) when prices are negotiated, bargaining ability becomes available as an 
additional supply shifter; and (ii) when prices are fixed in long-term contracts and 
demand shifts over time, the observed prices and quantities will be “out of equilib-
rium” until price is renegotiated. When price is renegotiated, the movement will be 
along the demand curve, identifying demand, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Along with these sources of exogenous variation, demand identification relies on 
a timing assumption: that price negotiations do not anticipate and take into account 
future changes in demand that are not already incorporated in current demand. This 
assumption seems reasonable in this context because any future development that 
is certain enough to be taken into account in pricing negotiations seems likely to 
already be incorporated into current demand. Failure of this assumption would 
require a situation where a device salesperson knows about a forthcoming study 
regarding a stent, convinces the hospital purchasing negotiator that this future study 
will increase future demand, but keeps this information from doctors so that it does 
not increase current demand.
Under this identifying assumption, if new prices are always negotiated at the 
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Figure 3. Fixed Price Contracts Provide a New Source of Identification
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any subsequent changes in demand, and there is no simultaneity problem in using 
contemporaneous price as its own instrument. I take a more conservative approach, 
however, and construct a set of instrumental variables using one-month lags to 
ensure that the instruments are uncorrelated with unobservable changes in demand 
over time. I instrument for the price of each stent using: (i) lagged own price, which 
uses the economics of long-term contracts as a source of identifying variation; and 
(ii) the lagged average price of other stents at the same hospital, which captures 
supply-side variation over time in hospital bargaining ability (and also in competi-
tion as demand for other stents changes, similar in spirit to the Berry, Levinsohn, 
and Pakes 1995 instruments).
Similar to Lee (2009) and Sweeting (2007), these lagged values will be cor-
related with contemporaneous price if any of demand, cost, or bargaining ability 
evolve over time according to some imperfectly persistent process. Both demand 
and bargaining ability should do so in this application. Monthly variation in 
demand occurs due to changes in doctor preferences (as new studies are released 
and device salespeople spread the word) or doctor turnover within a hospital over 
time. Imperfectly persistent variation in bargaining abilities would result from 
changes over time in the individuals involved in bargaining for a given stent at a 
given hospital, changes in the incentives faced by the same individuals, or learning 
by the same individuals over time. Online Appendix C confirms that these instru-
ments are strongly correlated with price.
The nonlinear parameters in the demand function—the mixture parameters 
( λ bms ,  λ des ) and nested logit parameters ( σ stent ,  σ des )—are identified by the extent to 
which market share responses to price changes vary nonlinearly within stent type, 
across stent types, and versus the outside good. To capture the nonlinearities, I use a 
semiparametric basis of the squares of the price instruments, lagged market shares, 
and their interaction. To capture the substitution patterns across groups, I use lagged 
logarithms of the within-stent and within-DES market shares (the standard nested 
logit instruments). Other regressors serve as their own instruments, as detailed in 
online Appendix B.
Elasticities and Surplus Measures.—The demand parameters enter the pric-
ing model through expected quantities, elasticities, and hospital surplus measures. 
The maintained assumption is that all of these measures can be obtained from the 
revealed preference estimates of the utility parameters for how doctors incorporate 
their own preferences, hospital preferences, and patient preferences in choosing a 
treatment for each patient. Further, I assume that these utility parameters are struc-
tural in the sense that they do not change with the changes in market structure con-
sidered in Section IV.
At the time of contracting, the exact set of patients that will show up at the hos-
pital is uncertain. So expected quantities for any given price vector  p ht = {  p jht } j∈  ht  
are anticipated via expected market shares by  q jht ( p ht ) =  s jht ( p ht ) Q ht . Price 
 elasticities,  
∂ q jht 
 _∂  p kht    p kht  _q jht  and hospital surplus,  π ht =  ∑ j∈  ht  
 
  ∫  A jht  
 
  u ijht  _
 θ p   dε are similarly 
considered in expectation. The explicit equations for all three come from the dis-
tributional assumption on ε, and are thus a linear combination of the well-known 
equations for the nested logit, detailed in the online estimation Appendix B.
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Deriving expected quantities and elasticities in this way matches the modeling 
setup and reality in the stent market that the decision about how to treat each patient 
is made by the physician, and thus represents how that physician weights her own 
preferences, those of the patient, and those of the hospital. Extending this physician 
utility function to the hospital surplus measure that will enter pricing  negotiations, 
though, is not an obvious step and warrants further discussion. The motivation behind 
this step—which says implicitly that doctors and administrators behave according to 
the same utility function in assessing the value of a given stent—can be best captured 
by a quote from an article on physician preference items in the Journal of Healthcare 
Contracting (2009, p.12): “In many cases, physicians—when given good data to 
work with—will work out supply chain issues amongst themselves in a way that 
pleases both the clinical and administrative sides of the house.” The intuition behind 
this comes from the fact that, despite their different roles within the organization, 
in the end doctors and administrators care about many of the same things: patient 
health, doctor satisfaction, and hospital profitability.
What if the surplus function for administrators who negotiate prices is different 
than that of doctors who choose which stents to use (e.g., more price sensitive)? To 
the extent this is the case, it will be captured in the bargaining ability parameters in 
the pricing model presented in the next section. This introduces a slightly different 
interpretation for a high hospital bargaining ability. A high bargaining ability may 
result from the ability to drive a better deal with device manufacturers, or it may 
result from an administrator’s power to maintain and act upon a more price-sensitive 
view of the available stents than the doctors at that hospital.
B. Modeling Pricing with Competition and Bargaining
Prices are set in a model of bargaining in the presence of competition where each 
hospital negotiates with each manufacturer separately and simultaneously, with the 
outcome of each negotiation satisfying the bilateral Nash bargaining solution. The 
outcomes of these bilateral negotiations must be consistent with one another, form-
ing a Nash equilibrium in the sense that no party wants to renegotiate. Formally, 
prices are determined as a Nash equilibrium of bilateral Nash bargaining problems 
(first introduced in Horn and Wolinsky 1988). Each bilateral price maximizes the 
Nash product of manufacturer profits and hospital surplus, taking the other prices 
as given, solving
(7)  max 
p jht 
 
   [ q jht ( p ht )(  p jht −  c jht ) ]  b jt (h) [ π ht ( p ht ) −  d jht ]  b ht ( j)  ∀j ∈   ht ,
where the parameters  b jt (h),   b ht ( j) ≥ 0 represent the bargaining ability of the man-
ufacturer and hospital vis-à-vis each other, respectively, and  d jht is the hospital’s 
disagreement payoff when no contract with j is signed. The manufacturer’s dis-
agreement payoff is equal to marginal cost by the assumptions that the hospital is 
a monopsonist, the manufacturer is not capacity constrained, and each hospital is 
small enough that any returns to scale in manufacturing are not affected by inclu-
sion or exclusion from a single hospital. Here I write the model with each product 
negotiated separately, though it is possible to allow for multiproduct manufacturers, 
as discussed in online Appendix BB2.
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A variation of this model has been used in prior empirical work by Crawford 
and Yurukoglu (2012), and many related models have been developed in theoretical 
work on bilateral negotiations with externalities (e.g., Stole and Zwiebel 1996; de 
Fontenay and Gans 2007). This prior work includes detailed discussions on how this 
model “nests” the solutions to many other pricing models of interest. Of  particular 
interest here are: when the hospital has zero bargaining ability ( b ht ( j) = 0, ∀j ∈   ht ), 
manufacturers set prices in a Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium; and when a 
 manufacturer has zero bargaining ability ( b jt (h) = 0), that manufacturer prices at 
cost. Also, different assumptions on the threat points,  d jht , correspond with differ-
ent notions of bargaining. Here I follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Crawford 
and Yurukoglu (2012), letting  d jht :=  π ht ( p ht ;   ht \{ j}), where the parties assume that 
other contracts would not be renegotiated if they did not reach agreement.
The clearest way to understand the model is by taking the first-order conditions of 
equation (7), which yield the following pricing equation:
(8)  p jht =  c jht +   b jt (h) _   b jt (h) +  b ht ( j)  [ (1 +  ∂ q jht  _∂ p jht    p jht −  c jht  _ q jht   )   π ht −  d jht  _ q jht   + p jht −  c jht  ] ,
 8 8
 NTU adjustment “Added Value” of j
which says that equilibrium prices are equal to cost plus a margin that is the manu-
facturer’s bargaining ability relative to that of the hospital, multiplied by product 
j’s “added value:” the additional surplus created when the hospital contracts with 
product j versus when the hospital doesn’t contract with product j. The portion of 
the added value appropriated by the hospital is adjusted by a term that takes into 
account that, in this nontransferable utility (NTU) game, a dollar increase in price 
also results in a decrease in quantity, so it does not transfer linearly into manufac-
turer profits.
The model requires that the term  
∂ q j 
 _∂ p j   
 p j −  c j 
 _ q j   lies in the interval [−1, 0] (whereas the 
Bertrand-Nash case, where manufacturers set price, requires that it be exactly negative 
one).17 This requirement means that, taking the prices in other negotiations as given, 
equilibrium prices must fall in the range where each manufacturer would prefer to 
increase price and the hospital would prefer to decrease price. Thus, prices are always 
between marginal cost and the manufacturer’s Bertrand-Nash best-response price.
Competition between substitutes enters this model in two ways: (i) via the hos-
pital’s disagreement point of not contracting with a given product; and (ii) via the 
elasticities. The constraint of the hospital’s disagreement point is reminiscent of 
solutions such as the Core, whereas the elasticities are directly related to standard 
models of price competition with differentiated products.18 Via these two effects, 
17 Algebraic manipulation of the pricing equation gives p − c =   b j  _  b h  ( 1 +  ∂q _ ∂p  p − c _q  )  π − d _q  . For price above 
cost and  d jh =  π h ( p;   \{  j }), all the components of this equation are positive, requiring that 1 +  ∂q _ ∂p  p − c _q  > 0 
as well.
18 Another way to see the connection between the two models is to look at the “elasticity pricing rule” generated 
by this model,  
 p j −  c j 
 _ p j   =  1  ___   −  ∂ q j  _∂ p j   
 p j 
 _  q j +   b h ( j ) _ b j (h)   
p
  ( π h −  d jh )/ q j  
 , which is the same as the one from the Bertrand-Nash 
model when  b h = 0.
161grennan: price discrimination and bargainingVoL. 103 no. 1
more “competition,” such as lower prices or greater substitutability among products, 
decreases both the added value and NTU adjustment terms, leaving a smaller piece 
of the pie for product j to capture. Conditional on competition, however, the amount 
of value captured depends on bargaining via  
 b j (h) _ 
 b j (h) +  b h ( j) .
Bargaining Effects in Nonuniform versus Uniform Pricing.—This model also 
clarifies how bargaining enriches the set of forces that need to be considered 
when considering nonuniform (discriminatory) prices versus more uniform pric-
ing regimes. The counterfactual simulations of GPOs and hospital mergers in 
Section IV allow for negotiation of a single price for each stent j with a set of 
hospitals h ∈ . Looking at the pricing equation that emerges in this case (where 
the bar above a term denotes the quantity-weighted average over hospitals; e.g., 
 
__ x jh :=  ∑ h 
   q jh  _ ∑h  q jh   x jh ):
(9)  p j =  __ c jh +   b j () __   b j () +  b  ( j )  ( 1 +  __________  ∂ q jh  _∂ p j     p j −  c jh _ q jh  )   π h −  d jh  _ q jh   +  p j −  c jh 
5 8
bargaining effect demand/competitive effect
illustrates how the uniform case in equation (9) differs from the nonuniform case 
in equation (8) in two important ways. First, under nonuniform pricing the criti-
cal demand parameters are the product-hospital elasticities, whereas under uniform 
pricing the relevant elasticity is a quantity-weighted average of these elasticities. 
This is the term underlying the competitive effects discussed in the price discrimi-
nation literature. Second, in the nonuniform case the key bargaining term is the 
product-hospital bargaining ratio, whereas under uniform pricing, the bargaining 
ratio is the same across all hospitals. This bargaining effect is new, and it inter-
acts with the competitive effect: for a change from nonuniform to uniform pricing, 
the role of symmetry in demand increases as the hospital group bargaining ability 
increases. The estimates in Section IV suggest that both competitive and bargaining 
effects play quantitatively important roles in understanding the impact of GPOs and 
hospital mergers on stent prices.
Pricing: Identification and Estimation.—This section shows how this pricing 
model can be combined with the demand estimates in order to estimate costs and 
relative bargaining abilities. The quantities to be estimated in the pricing equation 
(8) are costs,  c jht , and the relative bargaining ability ratio   b ht (  j ) _ b jt (h)  . A full statistical 
model requires specifications for costs and bargaining in terms of data, parameters, 
and unobservables. Because the full distributions of  c jht and   b ht (  j ) _ b jt (h)  are not separately 
identified, one of these specifications must be entirely in terms of data and param-
eters—no unobservables (estimating both distributions without restriction would 
be analogous to attempting to estimate separate slope and intercept parameters for 
every observation in a linear regression).
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I specify manufacturer marginal costs by
(10)  c jht = γj =  γ bms  1 {  j=bms} +  γ des  1 {  j=des} ,
so that cost is determined entirely by whether the stent is a BMS or DES. Ideally, 
marginal costs would be stent-specific, but the data in this study is not able to  identify 
a more flexible specification. This issue, and the robustness of the paper’s results to 
cost estimates, are discussed at length in the results. I further assume that there are 
no unobservable determinants of costs. This assumption seems reasonable in this 
context because marginal costs of production and distribution are thought to be quite 
low and to vary little (if at all) for a given product across hospitals and time. Also, 
it allows me to estimate the full distribution of relative bargaining abilities, which I 
am specifically interested in for this study.
For relative bargaining ability, I specify
(11)   b jt (h) _ b ht (  j )  =  β jh  ν jht ,
where  β jh measures the average relative bargaining ability of stent j to hospital h, 
capturing firm-specific features (such as hospital size) as well as allowing for differ-
ent bargaining abilities for the same hospital across manufacturers and vice versa; 
ν jht is the econometric unobservable term that measures the extent to which bargain-
ing outcomes in the data deviate from the outcomes suggested by the pair-specific 
bargaining abilities;  ν jht could represent the evolution of bargaining abilities over 
time (due to learning, changes in personnel, or changes in organizational incentives) 
or the possibility that bargaining outcomes are simply random (due to idiosyncratic 
events that might affect a particular negotiation). To the extent that bargaining out-
comes vary a great deal over time, this specification will set  β jh = 1, and all varia-
tion will be due to the random unobservable term  ν jht .
Estimation of Costs and Bargaining Abilities.—Combining the cost and bargain-
ing specifications with the pricing equation gives the statistical model
(12) pjht = γj +  β jh  ν jht [  ( 1 +  ∂  q jht  _∂  p jht    p jht −  γ j  _ q jht   )   π ht −  d jht  _ q jht   ] ,
and rearranging and taking logarithms so that the unobservable enters linearly gives
(13) ln  ( g( X jht s ;  γ) ) = ln ( β jh ) + ln ( ν jht ),
where g( X jht s ; γ):=   p jht −  γ j   __ 
 ( 1 +  ∂  q jht  _∂  p jht    p jht −  γ j  _ q jht   )   π ht −  d jht  _ q jht    is the ratio of the amount of per-unit 
added value that goes to the hospital to the amount that goes to the manufacturer, 
adjusted by the elasticity term to account for NTU. Then the cost and bargaining 
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parameters can be estimated based on the assumption E[ln(ν) |  Z s ] = 0 for a set of 
instrumental variables  Z s . A detailed discussion of the estimation procedure can be 
found in online Appendix B.
Pricing Instruments and Identification.—The statistical model (12) based on the 
pricing equation shows clearly how the cost and bargaining ability parameters are 
separately identified: cost enters price as a constant term, while the relative bargaining 
abilities of the manufacturer-hospital pair are identified by the extent to which price 
changes as the added value of the stent changes. The only potential problem is that 
added value can change in response to supply shifts as well as demand shifts because 
in this NTU game added value is a function of price (and thus bargaining abilities and 
costs). Higher bargaining ability can lead to a higher price and lower added value, 
biasing  β jh downward. This is the supply side of the simultaneity problem.
While this is a potentially large problem in theory, I expect it to be small in 
this context for two reasons: First, allowing for stent-hospital–specific bargaining 
parameters controls for fixed stent-hospital differences, meaning that the variation 
in unobserved bargaining ability is within stent-hospital and thus likely to be less 
of a problem than if variation across hospitals were used. Second, industry knowl-
edge predicts (and demand estimates in the next section confirm) that prices play a 
relatively small role in driving substitution between products in this market, so the 
decrease in added value for an increase in bargaining ability (the mechanism that 
causes the potential bias) should be small.
Fortunately, the panel data and the fact that demand realizations are observed 
much more frequently than price renegotiations again offer an instrumental variables 
strategy to form predictions of the added value that are not correlated with a simulta-
neous change in bargaining ability. Similar to the functions of lagged shares on the 
demand side, lagged added value will be a valid instrument if any of cost, bargaining 
abilities, or demand evolve according to imperfectly persistent processes. The exo-
geneity of these instruments again relies on a timing assumption: that demand does 
not change in response to anticipated future changes in bargaining abilities.
III. Estimation Results
In this section, I discuss the estimates obtained via the framework developed in 
Section II. I first present the demand and cost parameters and compare these to 
external data sources as a way to check that the model captures the industry in a 
realistic way. The results show that heterogeneity in demand and bargaining ability 
both play an important role in the observed price variation.
A. Demand Parameters
The demand parameters are a critical piece of the model because they give the dis-
tribution of preferences for each stent across hospitals and across doctors/patients 
within each hospital. These preferences relate directly to own and cross-elastic-
ities, consumer surplus, and added value measures that enter the industry model 
and welfare analysis. This section discusses those quantities directly for the pre-
ferred demand model. Online Appendix C presents the utility parameter estimates 
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 themselves across several specifications used to determine the robustness and appro-
priateness of the one used here.
Demand Elasticities.—Table 4 shows the distributions of the elasticities for each 
type of stent across stents, hospitals, and months.19 The own-elasticity estimates vary 
across particular stents and hospitals, but in all cases they are quite low, with means 
−0.32 for BMS and −0.52 for DES. The small elasticities do not appear to be due 
to a failure of the demand identification strategy. As detailed in online Appendix C, 
the stent-hospital fixed effects, AR(1) disturbance, and instruments do an effective 
job of increasing the estimated price sensitivity compared to more naive approaches. 
Additionally, these small elasticities are consistent with two qualitative facts in the 
stent market: (i) doctors are not very price-sensitive, and (ii) prices are negotiated.
Price enters the doctor’s choice of treatment for a given patient because of pressure 
from administrators for doctors to take price into account where it is reasonable to 
do so. The small elasticity estimates show that price does matter in treatment choice, 
but relatively little. This is consistent with how industry participants describe doctor 
behavior, especially for physician preference items like coronary stents. It is also 
consistent with the limited evidence from previous studies that suggest physicians 
and hospitals are relatively insensitive to financial incentives: Gaynor, Rebitzer, and 
Taylor (2004) find health maintenance organizations are able to reduce costs by 5 
percent through physician incentive programs; and Dafny (2005) finds little evi-
dence that hospitals adjust intensity or quality of care in response to changes in 
diagnosis-specific prices.
19 When interpreting the elasticity estimates, it is useful to keep in mind that on average, DES prices are about 
two and a half times (and shares about six times) those of BMS. For example, the largest cross-elasticity is for BMS 
with respect to DES price, but this is not because of increased substitution on this dimension. It is because  quantities 
for BMS are small and prices for DES are large, so that a small percentage change in DES price tends to have a 
larger effect on BMS quantity in percentage terms.
Table 4—Own- and Cross-Elasticity Estimates
Price elasticity of  q j : With respect to  p k : Mean SD Min Max
BMS Own −0.32 0.07 −0.70 −0.09
(0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
Other BMS 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
DES 0.12 0.14 0.00 1.70
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
DES Own −0.52 0.11 −0.99 −0.09
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
BMS 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.24
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Other DES 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Outside alternative BMS 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
DES 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.60
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
Notes:  
∂  q j 
 _ ∂  p k  
 p k  _  q j distributions across hospitals, months, and stents of that type. Own-elasticities less than −1 are con-
sistent with negotiated prices, but not with suppliers setting prices to price-taking buyers.
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Another important point to keep in mind when interpreting the elasticity esti-
mates is that, with negotiated prices, elasticities combine demand, competition, and 
 bargaining abilities. In particular—as shown in Section IIIB—the bargaining model 
requires that −1 ≤  ∂ q _∂ p   p − c _q  ≤ 0. Small elasticities go hand in hand with bargaining 
because prices are by construction lower than a price-setting supplier would set to 
a price-taking buyer. As a result, small elasticities could reflect low buyer price-
sensitivity, low supplier bargaining ability, or a combination of both.
Willingness-to-Pay, Total Surplus, and Added Value.—The demand parameters 
also provide the distribution of willingness-to-pay across doctor/patient types, prod-
ucts, hospitals, and months via wt  p ijht =  u ijht / θ  p +  p jht . The sum of willingness-to-
pay across treated patients gives the total surplus generated by stenting procedures 
(relative to the next best treatment, which is usually to do nothing). The mean will-
ingness-to-pay estimate for a stenting procedure is $6,521, which seems reasonable 
compared to the baseline reimbursement rate of $812 to doctors and the Huckman 
(2006) estimate of $4,900 for hospital marginal profit per angioplasty procedure. 
This provides another source of verification for the low price-sensitivity estimates, 
as greater price-sensitivity would imply lower willingness-to-pay.20 Willingness-to-
Pay Enters the Bargaining Model through a Product’s “Added Value”—The amount 
of extra value that is created when a hospital contracts with that product. Table 5 
provides summary statistics for the distribution of expected added value (expecta-
tion over doctor/patient types) per unit,   π h −  d jh  _ q jh   +  p jh (for now without subtracting 
20 For example, making all price elasticities consistent with manufacturer price-setting would require 
a − 1/−0.09 = 11 times increase in the price coefficient  θ p , which would in turn imply an incredibly low mean 
willingness-to-pay of $593.
Table 5—Added Value Estimates
Mean ($) SD ($) Min ($) Max ($)   N  H j  
BMS4 3,916 265 3,410 4,345 25
(425) (30) (40) (48)
BMS5 3,681 232 3,385 4,325 23
(410) (17) (39) (43)
BMS6 3,874 323 3,312 4,770 26
(426) (38) (36) (49)
BMS7 3,872 286 3372 4,798 39
(417) (32) (38) (53)
BMS8 3,811 461 3,272 4,860 11
(405) (27) (36) (43)
BMS9 4,163 441 3,539 5,840 47
(441) (44) (38) (57)
DES1 6,231 432 5,386 7,233 54
(488) (30) (43) (52)
DES2 6,262 382 5,559 6,973 54
(489) (37) (43) (56)
Notes: Summary of  
 π h −  d jh 
 _ q jh   +  p jh estimates across hospitals for each stent. The table is 
restricted to September 2005 (middle of the sample in time) to isolate cross-sectional variation. 
There are N = 54 hospitals sampled in this month; BMS1–3 have exited the market.
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manufacturer marginal costs), for each product across hospitals in September 2005. 
The added values are nearly three times as large as prices, indicating that hospitals 
(and doctors and patients) capture a large part of the added value. Further, the varia-
tion in added values is small enough that some variation in costs and/or bargaining 
abilities will be needed to explain the observed variation in prices.
B. Cost Estimates
The pricing equation specifies price as equal to cost plus a margin that is the 
bargaining ability of the manufacturer relative to the hospital times the elasticity-
adjusted added value up for negotiation. The standard approach—assuming that 
suppliers set prices in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium to price-taking buyers—is equiv-
alent to assuming a bargaining ability of zero for buyers. In that case, the implied 
cost for each observation is given from the demand estimates and supply assump-
tions. The analysis here relaxes the supply-side assumptions to allow buyers to have 
bargaining abilities greater than zero. In this case, cost parameters and bargaining 
ability parameters are separately identified by the fact that cost is an intercept term 
in the pricing equation while relative bargaining ability is a slope term. The results 
indicate that allowing for bargaining is critical for obtaining reasonable cost esti-
mates in the coronary stent market.
The first column in Table 6 presents the cost parameter estimates. The type-spe-
cific cost parameters—$34 for BMS and $1,103 for DES—are close to the range that 
industry experts report in the second column of the same table.21 The cost param-
eters are fairly imprecisely estimated, however. This is because the stent-hospital-
month added value terms range from three to seven thousand dollars, and prices for 
added values near zero are the ideal data to identify the cost parameters. Without 
such observations, the cost parameters are identified by extrapolations far from the 
region of the data, and small changes in the bargaining ability (slope) estimates can 
lead to large changes in the cost (intercept) estimates.
The third column in Table 6 gives the cost estimates implied by assuming that 
manufacturers set prices in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, and these results point out 
two ways in which that model falls short. First, the mean cost estimates are unreal-
istically small because prices are negotiated, and to assume that manufacturers set 
price is equivalent to assuming that hospitals have zero bargaining ability,  b h = 0, 
which is not the case on average. Second, the variation in cost estimates across 
hospitals is unrealistically large because the Bertrand model fails to allow for varia-
tion in relative bargaining abilities, forcing the variation that cannot be explained 
by willingness-to-pay and competition into costs. Any model with fixed bargaining 
abilities will produce similarly unreasonable variation in costs.
21 Sources are interviews with current and former industry employees as well as Burns (2005). From a manu-
facturing perspective, a DES is essentially a BMS with a polymer-drug coating. The added cost of a DES is a result 
of the royalty paid to the drug patent owner (thought to be about $100 per stent); the added cost of the process of 
adding the drug coating; and the quality of the process of adding the drug coating. This last point can be particularly 
important, as some industry engineers quoted yields from the coating process as 15–20 percent, meaning that only 
about one in six DES passes quality inspection after the coating process. The variation in these ranges reflects dif-
ferent experts’ assumptions regarding this and other aspects of what they think should enter marginal costs.
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Thus, the model estimated in this paper, which allows for bargaining and hetero-
geneity in bargaining abilities, yields more reasonable cost estimates. Unfortunately, 
the cost estimates are imprecise because the observed added value measures are 
large. Fortunately, the bargaining distribution and counterfactual estimates are 
robust to a variety of assumptions regarding costs. Online Appendix C illustrates 
how any unobserved cost variation would have to be unrealistically large to materi-
ally affect the results.
C. Bargaining Distribution Estimates
Given demand and cost estimates, the estimated distribution of relative bargain-
ing abilities,  β jh  ν jht , is given by the pricing equation. This distribution is easiest to 
interpret when each ratio is normalized to  
 b jt (h) _ 
 b jt (h) +  b ht (  j ) =  
 β jh ν jht 
 _ 
 β jh  ν jht + 1 , which takes 
the value 0 when the manufacturer prices at cost, and 1 when the manufacturer sets 
its Bertrand best-response price.
Figure 4 shows that both of these special cases are always rejected (the minimum 
observed is 0.08 and maximum 0.71). The mean of 0.33 indicates that, on aver-
age, hospitals have greater bargaining ability parameters than manufacturers. This 
is in addition to the fact that, as a monopsonist, the hospital extracts surplus via 
competition between the stents. With standard deviation of 0.07, however, there is 
significant variation around this mean. A companion paper, Grennan (2012), uses 
the panel structure of the data and hospital characteristics to further explore this 
bargaining ability variation. Importantly for this study, the panel data allows for 
a regression of ln( β jh  ν jht ) on manufacturer and hospital dummy variables, and the 
coefficients on each firm dummy variable ( β j ,  β h ) provide a measure of the average 
bargaining ability of each firm across bargaining partners and over time. These firm-
specific bargaining abilities play an important role in calculating the expected prices 
under GPOs and mergers in Section IV.
IV. The Welfare Effects of More Uniform Pricing
The results in the previous section indicate that the observed price variation across 
hospitals for a given stent comes from variation in both demand and bargaining 





Bertrand,  b h = 0 
Mean SD
BMS cost,  γ bms ($) 34 100 – 400 −2,211 547(79) (471) (75)
DES cost,  γ des ($) 1,103 400 –1,600 −2,481 1,325(286) (660) (174)
Notes: The first column reports marginal cost estimates for the bargaining model used in this 
paper. Column two reports a range of industry expert estimates for per-unit costs. Column three 
reports marginal cost estimates (mean and standard deviation across stent-hospital-months) 
implied by the model if manufacturers were assumed to set prices. N = 10, 098. Standard 
errors clustered by hospital,  N H = 96.
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 abilities. Both of these sources of heterogeneity also play an important role in this 
section, which examines several counterfactual scenarios with more uniform pricing, 
including: uniform prices set by manufacturers (a potential outcome of transparency 
reforms); centrally negotiated pricing for all hospitals (via GPOs or government 
purchasing); and negotiated prices at the level of merged hospital systems. The anal-
ysis makes clear that the details of how more uniform prices are implemented matter 
a great deal for whether or not prices for stents would rise or fall. Two particularly 
important forces that play a role in all cases are the effect of a move to more uniform 
prices on: (i) the intensity of competition; and (ii) whether buyers are able to negoti-
ate, and if so, at what bargaining ability.
The effect of imposing uniform pricing on the intensity of competition is closely 
related to what the price discrimination literature calls “best-response (a)symmetry” 
(Robinson 1933; Corts 1998). If demand across hospitals for the different stents is 
symmetric in the sense that all stents prefer to set a higher price to the same hospitals 
(e.g., because compared to alternative treatments, these hospitals value all stents 
more than other hospitals), then a move to uniform pricing will tend to intensify 
competition (Holmes 1989; Stole 2007). On the other hand, if demand across hos-
pitals is asymmetric in the sense that some hospitals prefer one stent while other 
hospitals prefer another (and thus different stents want to set high prices in differ-
ent hospitals), then a move to uniform pricing will tend to soften competition as 
stent suppliers retreat to their more captive markets (Corts 1998). The results in this 

















Manufacturer relative bargaining ability,   b j (h) _   b j (h) +  b h ( j ) 
Mean SD SD/Mean Min. Max. N
   
 b jt (h) __   b jt (h) +  b ht  ( j ) 
0.33 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.71 10,098
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Figure 4. Distribution of Manufacturer Relative Bargaining Abilities,  
 b jt (h) __   b jt (h) +  b ht ( j ) 
Notes: Overall product-hospital-time observations. The measure takes the value 0 in the case 
where the hospital gets all the surplus (conditional on disagreement points) and the manufac-
turer prices at cost; and it takes the value 1 in the case where the manufacturer gets all the sur-
plus, pricing at the highest price consistent with competition. Standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by hospital.
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 section suggest that the market for coronary stents exhibits more asymmetry than 
symmetry in demand across hospitals, leading competition to soften and—holding 
all else equal—making hospitals worse off under any policy that imposes more uni-
form pricing.
One especially important factor that may not be held equal, however, is the impact 
of a change to more uniform pricing on bargaining abilities. Section IIB illustrated 
how this bargaining effect could play an important role in theory. The results in this 
section suggest that it plays an important quantitative role: in order to reduce stent 
prices, any change to more uniform pricing must also induce a (potentially large) 
increase in hospital bargaining ability.
The welfare effects of the various market interventions considered in the rest of 
this section depend upon exactly how that intervention triggers changes to compe-
tition and/or bargaining ability. A straightforward imposition of uniform pricing 
(either by mandate or perhaps indirectly through transparency measures) would 
both soften competition and remove hospitals’ ability to negotiate. More central-
ized purchasing (either through government or private group purchasing organiza-
tions) would suffer from softened competition, but has the opportunity to make up 
for this through increased bargaining ability. Mergers highlight the complemen-
tarity between bargaining ability and symmetry of demand—while the competi-
tive effect encourages mergers between hospitals with more symmetric variation 
in demand, the return to symmetry is increasing in the bargaining ability of the 
merged hospital group.
A. Centralized Pricing: Competitive and Bargaining Effects
In all of the counterfactual scenarios, prices are set according to a Nash equilib-
rium of Nash bargaining problems, as before; however, now there is only one price 
for each stent across the set  all hospitals (or for mergers in the next section, a 
subset of hospitals), so product and hospital profits are aggregated over hospitals. 
This has an interpretation of the hospitals bargaining collectively with each manu-
facturer, and the outcomes of these negotiations forming an equilibrium with one 
another, solving
(14)  max 
 p j 
 
  [ ∑ 
h∈
 
  q jh ( p j −  c j ) ]  b j   [  ∑ 
h∈
 
 ( π h −  d jh ) ]  b    ∀ j ∈ ,
where  b  is a bargaining parameter for all the hospitals collectively. Table 7 com-
pares the aggregate outcomes from the current price discrimination regime to coun-
terfactual predictions under uniform pricing for three different values of the hospital 
group bargaining ability—  b = 0,  __ β h, and max( β h ). In all cases, manufacturer bar-
gaining abilities are set to their estimated means versus all hospitals,  b j =  β j .
The most dramatic change occurs if hospitals are unable to bargain collectively 
( b  = 0). This could result from direct imposition, or, more likely, as a result of 
efforts to increase price transparency. There has been an active yet inconclusive 
policy debate on transparency in device pricing, with much of Issue 27, 2008, of 
Health Affairs devoted to the topic. While there are theoretical discussions on both 
sides of this issue, to my knowledge this is the first related empirical analysis. If, as 
Armstrong (2006) suggests, it is exactly the lack of transparency that allows sellers 
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to cut the “secret discounts” that lead to different hospitals paying different prices, 
then increasing transparency could provide manufacturers a mechanism to commit 
to take-it-or-leave-it uniform pricing.22
To the extent that price transparency would lead to this outcome, it would have 
exactly the opposite effect that policymakers concerned with hospital costs are 
looking for. I estimate that a move to uniform pricing with price-taking hospitals 
would cause prices and manufacturer profits to approximately double; hospital 
surpluses to decrease by 48 percent (profits 160 percent);23 and total surpluses to 
decrease by 19 percent. This large predicted price increase results from the fact 
that doctor/patient/hospital demand is estimated to be rather insensitive to price, 
and this counterfactual takes aways hospitals’ ability to negotiate price. Prices at 
more than double the observed level are well outside the observed range of data (in 
particular, the equilibrium between administrators and doctors that induces doctor 
price sensitivity could be very different here), so these exact numbers should be 
taken with some skepticism. However, the robust takeaway is that any policy that 
removes the hospitals’ power to negotiate would likely increase the prices hospitals 
pay for stents.
More Uniform Prices Means Less Competition.—The  b H = 0 case is an extreme 
one in that it forces hospitals to become price-takers. In contrast, many implemented 
22 One could imagine transparency having effects other than the extreme case analyzed here. A full analysis of 
the effect of transparency or other mechanisms such as most-favored-nation clauses would require a model of how 
these variables influence bargaining ability as well as data to identify how much. Such an analysis is beyond the 
current theoretical frontier and also beyond the data available here.
23 Using detailed accounting data for hospitals in New York state, Huckman (2006) finds that marginal profits 
for angioplasty are, on average, 30 percent of revenues. I use this number to get ballpark estimates for the change 
in hospital profits implied by the surplus changes predicted by my model.
Table 7—Effects of Changing to Uniform Pricing
Current regime
Percent change with uniform prices
  b  = 0   b  =  ˉ  β h   b  = max( β h ) 
Manufacturer profits ($M/hospital/year) 1.24 81 8 −15
(27) (1) (3)
Hospital surplus ($M/hospital/year) 4.32 −48 −1.4 7.2
(0.58) (2) (0.3) (0.5)
Total surplus ($M/hospital/year) 5.56 −19 0.7 2.2
(0.75) (1) (0.1) (0.2)
Total stentings (stents/hospital/year) 977 −43 −1.1 5.9
(2) (0.3) (0.4)
Mean BMS price ($/stent) 1,016 207 1.7 −25
(35) (0.4) (1.6)
Mean DES price ($/stent) 2,509 114 1.7 −14
(14) (0.7) (0.9)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by hospital. Equilibrium outcomes under the current negoti-
ated price regime compared to those under uniform pricing (e.g., GPO of all hospitals in sample) for September 
2005. Column 2 sets  b  to zero, the case where hospitals do not bargain collectively and manufacturers set prices. 
Column 3 sets bargaining ability of the group of hospitals,  b  , to the mean of individual hospitals,  
__ β h, in order to 
isolate the change to competition. Column 4 sets  b  to the maximum estimated bargaining ability of any individual 
hospital.
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and proposed interventions in healthcare purchasing involve more centralized pric-
ing that enforces uniform prices across large groups of hospitals, but also create 
a central purchasing authority that is able to negotiate on behalf of the “merged” 
group. In these cases with centralized negotiations, the results are more nuanced. 
Because there is little substitution to alternative treatments due to moderate changes 
in stent prices, the effects on the total number of stentings and total welfare are 
small. As a result, the interesting changes are in the way the surplus is split between 
the device manufacturers and hospitals, and these changes are driven by a combina-
tion of the competitive and bargaining effects.
The results when hospitals bargain collectively at the mean bargaining ability of 
all the hospitals,  b  =  __ β h, isolate the competitive effect and show how competition 
softens under uniform pricing. Prices increase by 2 percent on average; manufac-
turer profits increase by 8 percent; and hospital surplus decreases by 1.4 percent 
(profits 5 percent).24
This competitive effect is consistent with the theoretical results on best-response 
asymmetry (Corts 1998) as well as the reduced-form evidence in Section II regard-
ing the amount of asymmetry across hospitals in the market share data. It is also 
consistent with related studies in the gasoline (Hastings 2008) and coffee markets 
(Villas-Boas 2009), which also find that prices increase with a change to nondis-
crimination. The hospital merger experiments in Section IVB explore this com-
petitive effect in greater detail, using variation in the amount of symmetry among 
groups of merging hospitals to quantify the relationship between symmetry and post 
merger hospital profits. Before exploring the competitive effect further, though, the 
last column of Table 7 sheds light on a feature that has not been noted before: the 
effect of bargaining ability on a change to more uniform pricing.
The Bargaining Effect: Post “Merger” Bargaining Ability Matters.—The compet-
itive effect of merging demand across hospitals with asymmetric preferences works 
to raise prices, but the final price in any centralized purchasing scheme will depend 
on the bargaining ability of the “merged” group of hospitals. Allowing the group to 
have the maximum estimated bargaining ability across all hospitals,  b  = max( β h ), 
is enough to overcome the competitive disadvantage. In this case, prices and manu-
facturers’ profits fall by 14 percent and 15 percent; and hospital surplus increases by 
7.2 percent (profits 24 percent).
Figure 5 provides a more precise perspective on the competitive and bargaining 
effects. The group of hospitals would need a bargaining ability more than 7 percent 
larger than the average hospital (or above the 70th percentile of all hospitals) in 
order to overcome the disadvantage due to softer competition. Below this, hospitals 
would be worse off with group purchasing; above this, better off. The fact that only 
30 percent of hospitals have such a high bargaining ability speaks to how difficult it 
might be to obtain.
24 Setting the group bargaining ability to the average across hospitals is not a perfect way to isolate the change 
due to competition because there are still two changes. A cleaner measure is to do the change in two steps: first, let 
all hospitals negotiate their own prices, but with their bargaining abilities fixed at the average; second, have them 
negotiate as a group. The difference between the results in steps one and two isolates the true competitive effect. 
When I computed this, I found that the pure competitive effect accounts for over 90 percent of the change in prices.
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The importance of this bargaining effect underscores how thinking about hetero-
geneity in bargaining abilities is important not only for understanding the prices 
negotiated by individual hospitals, but also for calculating expected outcomes under 
more uniform pricing. Looking back to the previously conjectured sources of bar-
gaining abilities in the coronary stent market offers some guidance on how to think 
about the issue, but no solid prediction. To the extent that bargaining ability reflects 
actual negotiating skill of the individual purchasing administrator or the organiza-
tional incentive system in which that individual operates, it might stand to reason 
that the best individuals and practices could be employed by a centralized purchas-
ing group, leading to higher bargaining ability. On the other hand, to the extent that 
a large purchasing group might involve more bureaucracy and less influence with 
physicians, then bargaining ability might decrease. Unfortunately, the data is not 
available to directly address these effects in this study.
There are, however, external sources that provide some indication of the direc-
tion the combined competitive and bargaining effects take when large centralized 
purchasing groups are created. Looking at the data in Spain, the European Union 
(EU) country with the most centralized purchasing system, shows a low coefficient 
of variation of 0.06 but a high (relative to other EU countries) mean of $2,313 for 
DES2 across hospitals. Germany, which by contrast has a mostly decentralized pur-
chasing system, shows a higher coefficient of variation of 0.16 and a lower mean of 
$1,649 for the same stent in the same month. While this evidence is not systematic, 
it does show that more centralization in purchasing is not necessarily accompanied 
by enough bargaining ability to drive down prices relative to a decentralized sys-
tem. Similar evidence exists for the United States in the fact that hospital group 
GPOs play little to no meaningful role in the markets for coronary stents and other 
“ physician preference items” (Burns and Lee 2008). The analysis here offers an 


























outcome depends on bargaining





Percent change in  pi H ( b H )
with no discrimination
Bargaining ability of hospital group (relative to mean hospital),  b  / __ b h
Figure 5. Competitive and Bargaining Effects
Notes: The vertical axis is the percent change in hospital profits, and the horizontal axis is the bargaining ability of 
the hospital group as a ratio of the mean hospital bargaining ability. The upward-sloping curve shows the relation-
ship between the predicted hospital profits under uniform pricing and hospital bargaining ability.
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explanation for this: GPOs are unable to achieve enough of an increase in bargaining 
ability to overcome the competitive disadvantage created by aggregating demand 
across hospitals with asymmetric demand. Thus, GPOs are not able to provide value 
when it comes to physician preference items, where different doctors have brand 
loyalties to different manufacturers.
B. Hospital Mergers: Quantifying the Role of (A)symmetry
The results thus far are consistent with the theory that predicts more asymmetry 
softens competition under uniform pricing because manufacturers retreat to their 
captive markets. In real-world empirical settings, however, there is no such thing 
as complete symmetry or asymmetry, only some measure of one versus the other. 
Better understanding and quantifying this effect becomes especially important for 
thinking about hospital mergers because mergers may vary in the extent to which 
the merging hospitals exhibit (a)symmetry in their demand. This section develops 
a measure of demand symmetry among a group of buyers and quantifies the role of 
more or less symmetry in the context of hospital mergers into multihospital systems.
Of the 5,008 registered US community hospitals, 2,921 are part of a multihospi-
tal system, with an average of 7 hospitals per system.25 The argument in favor of 
hospital mergers into systems often includes arguments for reducing costs, but the 
evidence regarding whether or not they do so has been mixed (see, e.g., Dranove and 
Lindrooth 2003 and the literature cited therein). In particular, there has been espe-
cially little evidence for (or against) the assertion that mergers lower input costs by 
increasing buyer market power. This section provides evidence regarding the condi-
tions under which hospital mergers might lower prices for coronary stents.
I examine this question by simulating 100 different mergers between groups 
of 7 hospitals drawn randomly from the dataset. Because the randomly selected 
groups of hospitals differ in their amount of symmetry in demand, these merger 
experiments provide a context in which to look at the impact of symmetry on the 
degree to which competition changes under uniform pricing. I measure symme-
try among a group of hospitals by taking the across-hospital, within-stent variation 
in stent own-elasticities  ( η jh :=  ∂  q jh  _∂  p jh    p jh  _ q jh  ) explained by hospital dummy variables 
divided by the total stent-hospital variation, Symmetry :=  var(  ηjh ( jFE, hFE )) − var(  ηjh ( jFE ))   __
var( η jh ) − var(  ηjh ( jFE )) . 
This measure is equal to one when hospitals are perfectly symmetric (purely verti-
cally differentiated in their demand for the different stents), and equal to zero when 
hospitals are perfectly asymmetric (purely horizontally differentiated). I simulate 
the new equilibrium prices and welfare measures after the mergers for two different 
assumptions on the post merger bargaining abilities: the mean,  b  =  ˉ  β h , and the 
max,  b  = max( β h ), of the pre merger bargaining abilities of the merging hospitals. 
The outcomes of these merger experiments, shown in Figure 6, both quantify the 
relative size of competitive and bargaining effects, and also highlight the comple-
mentarity between the two effects.
25 http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/fast-facts.html.
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Looking first at panel A—the case where the merged hospitals have the mean bar-
gaining ability of the merging hospitals (isolating the competitive effect)—the  fitted 
line predicts that a merger between hospitals with perfect asymmetry in demand 
would result in an 8.9 percent decrease in hospital profits. Hospital profits increase 
with symmetry at a slope of 7.5, predicting that a merger between hospitals with 
perfect symmetry would still result in a decrease of 1.4 percent in hospital profits. 
With an  R 2 of 0.06, the fitted line provides a noisy prediction of merger outcomes, so 
for very high levels of symmetry, the competitive effect will often flip and work in 
favor of uniform pricing. Despite this somewhat encouraging extrapolation, the data 
suggest that high levels of symmetry are rare—across the 100 simulated hospital 
groups, the maximum symmetry measure is 0.59 (mean 0.31 and minimum 0.09). 
Thus, for the highest symmetry actually observed, the competitive effect still softens 
competition substantially, with a predicted decrease of 4.5 percent in hospital profits.
Turning to panel B—the case where the merged hospitals have the maximum 
bargaining ability of the merging hospitals—the fitted line predicts that a merger 
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Panel A. Merge with  b  =   _ bh Panel B. Merge with  b  = max( b h )
Symmetry in own-elasticities across
merging hospitals
Merge with  b  =  b h Merge with  b  = max( b h ) 
Intercept (complete asymmetry) −8.9 0.42
(1.0) (1.2)
Slope (as symmetry increases) 7.5 20
(3.0) (3.5)
 R 2 0.06 0.24
Percent of mergers where hospital profits increase 1 92
Figure 6. Competition Softens More for Mergers between Hospitals with More Asymmetric Demand 
(This effect increases with bargaining ability)
Notes: Results for 100 mergers of 7 randomly selected (with replacement) hospitals. The two sets of results are for 
assumed post merger bargaining ability equal to mean and maximum of the merging hospitals. The vertical axis 
shows the pre- to post-merger change in hospital profits while the horizontal axis shows a measure of the amount 
of symmetry (vertical versus horizontal differentiation) in demand elasticities  ( η jh :=  ∂  q jh  _∂  p jh    p jh  _ q jh  ) across the merging 
hospitals, Symmetry :=  var(  ηjh ( jFE, hFE )) − var(  ηjh ( jFE))   ___  
var( η jh ) − var(  ηjh ( jFE))  (1 indicates perfect symmetry; 0 asymmetry).
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increase in hospital profits of 0.4 percent. Thus, the shift from mean to maximum 
bargaining ability was enough to erase the softening of competition for a merger of 
hospitals with very asymmetric preferences (though again the prediction is noisy, 
with an  R 2 of 0.24). Beyond this upward shift at low levels of symmetry, a perhaps 
more interesting result is the complementarity between symmetry and bargaining 
ability demonstrated by the dramatic increase in the slope of hospital profits with 
respect to symmetry to 20 (more than double the slope in the mean bargaining abil-
ity case). This increased slope predicts that mergers at the highest observed levels of 
symmetry will now result in a 12 percent increase in hospital profits.
These results suggest that, similar to GPOs, hospital mergers need to increase 
bargaining ability if they are to decrease the prices hospitals pay for coronary stents. 
In addition, the more symmetry, the better. These insights provide some new ways 
to think about the mechanisms that may be behind the mixed results in research 
on the effect of hospital mergers on costs. Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) find that 
hospital mergers into systems in general have no statistically significant impact on 
costs, but that mergers between hospitals that subsequently do business under a 
single license and report unified financial records decrease costs by 14 percent on 
average. While at least some of the 14 percent gains of the “fully merging” cases is 
due to reduced headcount in redundant roles, this paper offers two additional expla-
nations: (i) that hospitals are likely to more fully integrate postmerger when their 
doctors/patients/administrators exhibit less horizontally differentiated tastes; and 
(ii) that hospitals who integrate more fully are more likely to share best practices 
and learn how to maximize post merger bargaining ability.
V. Summary and Discussion
This paper combines new panel data on the prices and quantities transferred 
between medical device manufacturers and hospitals with a structural model of sup-
ply and demand to estimate the welfare effects of transparency, group purchasing, 
and hospital mergers in the coronary stent market. These interventions all restrict the 
ability of suppliers to sell at different prices to different hospitals. The major empiri-
cal challenge is that prices in the coronary stent market are negotiated (as they are 
in many business-to-business markets). I capture this using a model that generalizes 
the standard price-setting model to allow for bargaining, and I show how bargaining 
affects identification of both supply and demand parameters. The raw data and coun-
terfactual estimates provide evidence that asymmetry in demand across hospitals 
leads to a softening of competition under more uniform pricing, consistent with the 
theory of price discrimination with oligopoly. Final prices under nondiscrimination 
also depend on the collective bargaining ability of the merged hospitals, however, 
which must be large to overcome the disadvantage of softened competition.
Taken together, these results suggest that moving toward more uniform pricing 
may be a difficult and indirect route toward lowering the prices hospitals pay for 
physician preference items such as coronary stents. This could be one reason why 
GPOs play such a small role in contracting for physician preference items and why 
hospital mergers often don’t seem to reduce costs. If the goal is to lower the costs of 
medical technologies, a more fruitful approach might be to embrace the increased 
competition that comes with price variation and instead work directly on  increasing 
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bargaining ability and/or physician price sensitivity. Such an approach would be 
in line with the suggestion of Pauly and Burns (2008) for a focus on physician-
administrator relations.
In addition to addressing the research question at hand, this paper suggests sev-
eral avenues for future research. The quantitative results here suggest that both the 
nature of demand heterogeneity and bargaining ability—where firms end up within 
the range determined by costs, demand, and competition—matter. As more detailed 
data on vertical contracting relationships become available, it would be interesting 
to see the relative roles that demand (a)symmetry and bargaining ability play in 
other contexts.
Relatedly, while heterogeneity in bargaining abilities across firms plays an impor-
tant role in both fitting the observed data and predicting outcomes under more 
uniform pricing, little is known about the determinants of bargaining abilities. A 
companion paper, Grennan (2012), explores this issue further, but data limitations 
prevent more than a high-level, descriptive analysis. Anecdotal evidence from indus-
try professionals suggests that there are economic forces such as human capital and 
organizational structure/incentives underlying these firm-level bargaining abilities. 
Better understanding the determinants of bargaining ability could lead to interesting 
links among internal firm activities and market outcomes. Pursuing this research 
topic would require detailed data related to the price negotiation process and indi-
viduals involved in addition to the price and quantity data used here.
In the long run, market interventions that make prices more uniform, like any-
thing that affects firm profitability, could impact market entry and exit on both sides 
of the market. In the medical device market, this is particularly important because 
the buyer side represents the availability of medical care and the supplier side rep-
resents the availability of new medical technologies. Future research that takes a 
step toward endogenizing the choices of who contracts with whom and market 
entry and exit would extend our ability to answer more dynamic research ques-
tions regarding medical technologies and our understanding of the economics of 
business- to-business markets in general.
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